Die Frequenzkurven, die die lebendige Substanz charakterisieren, können als eine statische Beschreibung oder als das Ergebnis einer Entwicklung betrachtet werden.Im ersten Falle akzeptiert man ohne weiteres die gegebenen Verteilungen und man versucht, ihnen durch mathematische Gleichungen, die keine unmittelbare Wirklich-keitsbedeutung haben, nahezukommen. Das kausale Denken wird hier ausgeschaltet oder man gibt sich wenigstens mit nur sehr groben Analogien zufrieden.Verschiedene Methoden über die Genese der Frequenzkurven werden besprochen; dabei wird gezeigt, dass die Mehrheit der Fälle auf Hypothesen beruht, die biologisch wenig (...) begründet sind. Eine Ausnahme davon macht die Theorie vonJ. C. Kapteyn, weil er den Vorgang des Wachstums in die Genese einbezieht. Seine Methode weiter ausbauend kann man sich vorstellen, dass die Genese einer Frequenzkurve in erblich homogenem Pflanzenmaterial durch Variation der Wachstumsgeschwindigkeit zustandekommt.Auf solche Weise kann man in einem Koordinatensystem mit Länge und Zeit als Koordinaten ein “Deviationsraster” konstruieren.In einem experimentell untersuchten Fall ergab die graphische Methode mit völlig ausreichender Genauigkeit die schon gefundene Frequenz.Les courbes de fréquence qui caractérisent la matière vivante, peuvent être considérées ou comme une description statique ou bien comme le produit d'un développement.Dans le premier cas on accepte les distributions obtenues et on essaie de s'en rapprocher par des équations mathématiques qui n'ont pas une réalité effective. On ne recherche plus la causalité ou alors on se contente le plus souvent d'analogies très grossières.Les auteurs traitent des diverses méthodes de la genèse des courbes de fréquence et démontrent que la plupart des cas reposent sur des hypothèses qui ont peu de fond biologique. La théorie deM. J. C. Kapteyn fait exception parcequ'il introduit le processus de croissance dans la genèse. En poursuivant plus loin dans sa méthode on peut se figurer que la genèse d'une courbe de fréquence de plantes homogènes par hérédité s'expliquerait par des variations de vitesse de croissance.De cette façon on peut construire une “grille de déviation” dans un système en prenant longueur et temps comme coordonnées.Dans un cas essayé expérimentalement ce graphique donnait avec une exactitude assez grande la distribution de fréquence déjà trouvée. (shrink)

From an ethical point of view, there is an important distinction between two types of prenatal screening. The first of these targets maternal or foetal conditions (e.g., infectious diseases, blood group sensitization) where early detection allows for interventions that improve the chances of a healthy pregnancy outcome. The second screens for foetal conditions such as Down syndrome, where a timely diagnosis in most cases only allows for a choice between preparation for a child with special needs or termination of the (...) pregnancy. Whereas the former makes an easy fit with the prevention aim of most other population screening programmes, the latter does not. In order to steer clear from a possible eugenic reading of its aim, a wide international consensus has emerged for the view that prenatal screening of this type should have the atypical aim of helping women (couples) to make autonomous reproductive choices, rather than reducing the birth prevalence of the relevant disorders. However, keeping these types of prenatal screening apart may become increasingly difficult given the development of tests, such as the Non‐Invasive Prenatal Test, which cannot only be used for both types of screening but may also lead to interconnected findings on both sides of the divide. This makes it an urgent question: What the aim or aims of this new hybrid screening should be? As neither ‘prevention’ nor ‘autonomy’ will do, we argue for a normative framework that gives both aims their due, while recognizing the tensions between them. (shrink)

“With great power comes great responsibility.” In today’s world, with our growing technological power and the knowledge about its impact, we are considered to be responsible for many instances that not long ago would have been deemed a matter of fate. At the same time, the looming options of, e.g., genome editing or neuroprosthetics, threaten traditional notions of responsibility if no longer the person but the technology involved is deemed to be responsible for a specific behaviour. The growing ethical debate (...) on the expansion of human responsibility, e.g. when it comes to human-machine-interaction, ambient intelligence, or reproductive technologies, thus intertwines with the challenge to formulate an appropriate understanding of the concept of personal responsibility and our respective anthropological self-understanding in today’s technological world. The volume brings together both perspectives and aims at illuminating crucial dimensions of responsibility in light of technological innovation and our self-understanding as responsible beings. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the semantic analysis of the sentences in (1). (1a,b) contain the adverbial modifiers 'one after the other' and 'dog after dog', respectively, which add to the simple (1') information on how the overall event of the dogs entering the room is to be divided into subevents based on a division of the group of dogs into individual dogs. We call these adverbials pluractional adverbials, following e.g. Lasersohn's (1995) use of the term pluractionality for the (...) division of larger eventualities into subeventualities. (shrink)

Attachment theory ( Bowlby, 1969/1982 ) posits the existence of internal working models as a foundational feature of human bonds. Radical embodied approaches instead suggest that cognition requires no computation or representation, favoring a cognition situated in a body in an environmental context with affordances for action ( Chemero, 2009 ; Barrett, 2011 ; Wilson and Golonka, 2013 ; Casasanto and Lupyan, 2015 ). We explore whether embodied approaches to social soothing, interpersonal warmth, separation distress, and support seeking could replace (...) representational constructs such as internal working models with a view of relationship cognition anchored in the resources afforded to the individual by their brain, body, and environment in interaction. We review the neurobiological bases for social attachments and relationships and attempt to delineate how these systems overlap or don’t with more basic physiological systems in ways that support or contradict a radical embodied explanation. We suggest that many effects might be the result of the fact that relationship cognition depends on and emerges out of the action of neural systems that regulate several clearly physically grounded systems. For example, the neuropeptide oxytocin appears to be central to attachment and pair-bond behavior ( Carter and Keverne, 2002 ) and is implicated in social thermoregulation more broadly, being necessary for maintaining a warm body temperature (for a review, see IJzerman et al., 2015b ). Finally, we discuss the most challenging issues around taking a radically embodied perspective on social relationships. We find the most crucial challenge in individual differences in support seeking and responses to social contact, which have long been thought to be a function of representational structures in the mind (e.g., Baldwin, 1995 ). Together we entertain the thought to explain such individual differences without mediating representations or computations, but in the end propose a hybrid model of radical embodiment and internal representations. (shrink)

The concept of the national is often perceived, both in public and academic discourse as the central obstacle for the realization of cosmopolitan orientations. Consequently, debates about the nation tend to revolve around its persistence or its demise. We depart from this either-or perspective by investigating the formation of the ‘cosmopolitan nation’ as a facet of world risk society. Modern collectivities are increasingly preoccupied with debating, preventing and managing risks. However, unlike earlier manifestations of risk characterized by daring actions or (...) predictability models, global risks can no longer be calculated or forecast. Accordingly, more influence accrues to the perception of risk, largely constructed by media representations. Cosmopolitanized risk collectivities are engendered through the anticipation of endangered futures which are, for the most part, communicated through an increasingly global media scape. While global media events produce shared exposure, risk conceptions retain distinctive political-cultural features as their respective meanings are prefigured by path-dependent pasts. Nevertheless, the promulgation of risk societies, we argue, results in a reimagination of nationhood which takes place in the context of: global norms (e.g. human rights); globalized markets; transnational migrations; global generations and their embeddedness in civil society movements; and the local interpenetration of world religions to name but a few of the global backdrops shaping new associational intersections. We develop our argument in four interrelated steps. Contrary to essentialized notions of nationalism or universal versions of cosmopolitanism, we address the cosmopolitan reconfiguration of nationhood by differentiating between presumptions of thick belonging and the actual proliferation of cosmopolitan affiliations. In a second step we overcome the territorial fixation of the social sciences by shifting our attention to temporal dimensions, with a particular focus on competing conceptions of the future. In a third step we demonstrate how these cosmopolitan transformations of nationhood are taking place in the context of a world risk society regime that marshals a set of cosmopolitan imperatives situating the global other in our midst. In a fourth step we illustrate these developments by exploring how the mediatization of risk, and concomitant notions of the future, contribute to the reimagination of cosmopolitan risk collectivities. (shrink)

In three studies, we explored the retention and transfer of tool-making knowledge, learnt from an adult demonstration, to other temporal and task contexts. All studies used a variation of a task in which children had to make a hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a tall transparent tube. Children who failed to innovate the hook tool independently saw a demonstration. In Study 1, we tested children aged 4 to 6 years (N = 53) who had seen the original demonstration (...) 3 months earlier. Performance was excellent at the second time, indicating that children’s knowledge was retained over the 3 month period. In Studies 2 and 3 we explored transfer of the new knowledge to other tasks. In Study 2, children were given two variants of the apparatus that differed in surface characteristics (e.g. shape and colour). Participants generalised their knowledge to these new apparatuses even though the new pipecleaner also differed in size and colour. Five- to 6-year-olds (n = 22) almost always transferred their knowledge to problems where the same tool had to be made. Younger, 3- to 5-year-olds’ (n = 46), performance was more variable. In Study 3, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 146) saw a demonstration of hook making with a pipecleaner, but then had to make a tool by combining pieces of wooden dowel (or vice versa: original training on dowel, transfer to pipecleaner). Children did not transfer their tool-making knowledge to the new material. Children retained tool-making knowledge over time and transferred their knowledge to new situations in which they needed to make a similar tool from similar materials, but not different materials. We concluded that children’s ability to use tool-making knowledge in novel situations is likely to depend on memory and analogical reasoning, with the latter continuing to develop during middle childhood. (shrink)

The volume focusses on the ethical dimensions of the technological scaffold embedding human thought and action, which has been brought to attention of the cognitive sciences by situated cognition theories. There is a broad spectrum of technologies co-realising or enabling and enhancing human cognition and action, which vary in the degree of bodily integration, interactivity, adaptation processes, of reliance and indispensability etc. This technological scaffold of human cognition and action evolves rapidly. Some changes are continuous, some are eruptive. Technologies that (...) use machine learning e.g. could represent a qualitative leap in the technological scaffolding of human cognition and actions. The ethical consequences of applying situated cognition theories to practical cases had yet to find adequate attention and are elucidated in this volume. (shrink)

This book is a study of the origins and development of Greek science, focusing especially on the interactions of scientific and traditional patterns of thought from the sixth to the fourth centuries BC. The starting point is an examination of how certain Greek authors deployed the category of 'magic' and attacked magical beliefs and practices, and these attacks are related to their complex background in Greek medicine and speculative thought. In his second chapter Dr Lloyd outlines the development, and assesses (...) the significance, of the theory and practice of argument in early Greek science, and he follows this with a study of the development of empirical research. Finally the author confronts the question of why the Greeks invented science: what precisely was their contribution to science, and what social, economic, ideological and political factors had a bearing on the growth of science in Greece. (shrink)

Dr Lloyd writes for those who want to discover and explore Aristotle's work for themselves. He acts as mediator between Aristotle and the modern reader. The book is divided into two parts. The first tells the story of Aristotle's intellectual development as far as it can be reconstructed; the second presents the fundamentals of his thought in the main fields of inquiry which interested him: logic and metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics, politics, and literary criticism. The final chapter considers the unity (...) and coherence of Aristotle's philosophy, and records briefly his later influence on European thought. This is a concise and lucid account of the work of a difficult and profound thinker. Dr Lloyd's business is only with the essentials; but he does not shirk the difficulties which arise in their interpretation, nor does he invest Aristotle with a spurious modernity. (shrink)

Thomas Flynn's work on Sartre and Foucault, the first of a two-volume project, offers a unique opportunity for examining an existential theory of history. It occasions rethinking existential-social categories from the vantage point of the poststructuralist turn. And it contributes to developing existential variants of critical theory. The following questions guide me in each of the three above areas. First, how is human history intelligible, given not only our finite sense of ourselves but also claims that we have reached the (...) end of history? Second, with the poststructuralist eclipse of dialectics, can we render existential categories in social terms and vice versa? Third, critics decry grand theorizing even in fallibilist reason, e.g., of Habermas, while others are worried by the normative deficits of poststructuralist nominalism, e.g., of Foucault. Can existential variants of critical social theory, anticipated before Sartre by Marcuse, split the difference? (shrink)

This book has both a philosophic and a practical aim. Its philosophic aim is to understand civil religion. Its practical aim is to help restore confidence in the West by showing the superiority of the American civil religion to that of the Soviet Union. In the first part of the book, Rome is examined to show how the problem of civil religion first arose. In the second, the United States is used both to show how civil religion may develop gradually (...) and to set forward a model of a good—or, at least, potentially good-civil religion. In the final section, several modern political thinkers are discussed in order to trace the steps leading to the civil religion of Marxism. Henry’s thesis is that both the American and Communist civil religions are secularizations of Christianity, but, while the American civil religion lives in tension between a "public philosophy" that judges the United States by universal standards and a "civil theology" that deifies her existence, Communist ideology has no "public philosophy" but only a "civil theology" deifying the power of the state. (shrink)

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

G. E. L. Owen; VIII*—Aristotelian Pleasures, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 135–152, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

Originally published in 1965. This is a textbook of modern deductive logic, designed for beginners but leading further into the heart of the subject than most other books of the kind. The fields covered are the Propositional Calculus, the more elementary parts of the Predicate Calculus, and Syllogistic Logic treated from a modern point of view. In each of the systems discussed the main emphases are on Decision Procedures and Axiomatisation, and the material is presented with as much formal rigour (...) as is compatible with clarity of exposition. The techniques used are not only described but given a theoretical justification. Proofs of Consistency, Completeness and Independence are set out in detail. The fundamental characteristics of the various systems studies, and their relations to each other are established by meta-logical proofs, which are used freely in all sections of the book. Exercises are appended to most of the chapters, and answers are provided. (shrink)

The usual way for new cells to come into being is by division of old cells. So the zygote, which is a—new—single cell formed from two, the sperm and ovum, is an exception. Textbooks of human genetics usually say that this new cell is beginning of a new human individual. What this indicates is that they suddenly forget about identical twins.

_Zettel, _ an en face bilingual edition, collects fragments from Wittgenstein's work between 1929 and 1948 on issues of the mind, mathematics, and language.

This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical statements such as ‘twice two is four’ or ‘there is a prime number between 125 and 128’ are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and 128 would be to show that one did not understand (...) the use of such statements, and so would any attempt to answer the question. It is tempting to take another step and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two this is, surely, because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in this inference: ‘clocks are devices for measuring time’ is a timeless statement, but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with a favoured set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of timeless statements. (shrink)